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21. Introduction
The Soviet labour market, built on the ‘principle of equal pay for equal work'1 was
characterised by one of the highest female participation rates in the world. It may
therefore appear somewhat surprising to discover that studies of the Soviet wage
distribution (see Chapman, 1979; McAuley, 1979; Bergson, 1984; Atkinson and
Micklewright, 1992) reveal a level of gender wage differentials in keeping with that
found in many OECD economies. McAuley (1981) attributes this fact to the
comparative advantage held by men in meeting performance standards in certain
‘physical' occupations, which in turn, serves to segregate women into certain types of
jobs2.
The transition and the associated dismantling of the mechanisms that restrained the
labour market have dramatically altered the factors governing the determination of
wages. Given the background of Soviet gender-wage inequality, the sharp decline in
female participation rates in the transition countries3 and the emergence of greatly
improved micro-datasets one key question requiring empirical investigation concerns
the effect of the ongoing transition on the male-female wage differential.
To date, there have been several attempts to measure and explain the extent of the
gender wage gap in Russia (Silverman and Yanowitch, 1997; Reilly, 1999; Brainerd,
1998; Glinskaya and Mroz, 2000). Most of these studies are based on the Oaxaca-
Blinder (1973) decomposition. Overall, these studies suggested that the gender wage
gap increased during the initial transition period but that there has been little change in
the gender wage differential in the years that followed.  Note that all of the above
studies analysed the gender wage gap in the period before the 1998 Russian financial
crisis.
                                                
1 Documented in the Soviet labour code 1922
2 For example, Katz (1997) uses a household survey that was conducted in the urban town of Tarangog
in the Soviet period.  Based on the Oaxaca decomposition, he reported the ratio of female to male
hourly wages as 0.73, of which only 15.4 percent was accounted for by differences in endowments.
3 For details, see Boeri et al., (1998).
3A study of the Russian labour market is not complete without accounting for the
emergence of Russia's unique labour market characteristics. Unprecedented delays in
the payment of wages and the widespread use of payment in kind have become
endemic features of the Russian labour market in transition. Wage arrears, have
accumulated rapidly since 1994, reaching 8 billion dollars in 1997, and affecting 62
per cent of the households surveyed by the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS). As of early 1997, the stock of outstanding unpaid wages amounted to
approximately 275 per cent of the monthly wage bill of employees who were actually
owed wages (Russian Economic Trends, 1997, 1).
Several studies claim that the allocation of wage arrears is differentiated across
employees and used strategically by employers. Desai and Idson (1998) suggest that
employers tried to reduce the incidence and period of wage arrears for highly
productive workers to retain them in the firm and, as a result, less productive workers
became the primary targets for delays in wage payment. Earle and Sabirianova (1998)
maintain that firms use wage arrears in a discriminating way against employees who
have job specific skills. In the same spirit, Lehman et al. (1999) find that firms
allocate wage arrears to the most stable employees.
A large number of studies analyse the gender pay differential and the phenomenon of
wage arrears in separate strands and thus there has been little discussion of the actual
relationship between the gender wage gap and wage arrears. Specifically, were wage
arrears concentrated on female employees already suffering from higher wage
discrimination compared to male employees? Alternatively, did employers allocate
wage arrears among female employees in a manner that compensated them for the loss
encountered due to higher wage discrimination? Finally, how did the Russian
financial crisis of 1998 impact upon the gender wage gap and its association with
wage arrears? This paper sets out to investigate the above questions.
We found that the average gender wage gap was fairly stable during 1994-1996 but
that the differential widened following the financial crisis of 1998. In particular,
female employees at lower income levels were hurt most by the financial crisis.
Furthermore, we found that wage arrears and payment in kind acted as compensating
4mechanisms to offset the losses from higher wage discrimination, suggesting wage
arrears were driven by equity considerations for female workers. Yet the relationship
between wage arrears and the gender wage gap did not prove to be linear: female
employees suffering wage arrears at low levels of the wage distribution failed to enjoy
such compensation.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we examine the various approaches
adopted in wage discrimination studies and their application to countries in transition.
In section 3, after a brief discussion of the data, we estimate the wage equations and
correct for selectivity bias where necessary. In section 4, we analyse the size and
composition of the gender wage gap applying the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition; we
investigate wage differentials according to income percentiles and we explain the
effects of wage arrears and payment in kind on the gender wage gap. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. Wage discrimination: related literature
To date, there have been a number of attempts to explain and measure the extent of
the gender wage gap.   Most of these studies are based on the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973)
decomposition in which wage equations are estimated separately for men and women
in order to allow for different rewards by gender to a set of productive characteristics
or endowments. The male-female average wage differential is explained in terms of
the difference in average endowments evaluated at the male (or female) pay structure
and the difference in returns evaluated at the female (male) average endowment.
Note that, in the absence of discrimination, men and women will have the same return
(i.e. estimated coefficients) for similar endowments, so the second difference is
interpreted as “discrimination”.
Researchers have dealt with the issue of not knowing if the male or female pay
structure will prevail in the absence of discrimination (i.e. the “index number
5problem”)4 by reporting both estimates and thus, reporting a “discrimination” bracket.
Others, estimate the non discriminatory pay structure as the linear combination of the
estimated female and male return weighted by the percentage of females and males in
the sample (Cotton, 1988) or use the estimate of a pooled male-female wage equation
(Oaxaca and Ransom, 1989).
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Blau and Kahn (1996) extended the basic
decomposition to study the gender wage gap over time.  Changes in wage inequality
are explained by a) changes in observed characteristics or endowments, b) changes in
the returns to observable characteristics, and c) changes in the distribution of the
residuals due to both changes in percentile rankings within the residual wage
distribution and changes in the wage distribution itself5. This residual differential
provides the estimates of “discrimination”. Note that this approach is also subject to
the “index number problem”.
There is a growing empirical literature relating to the gender wage differential in the
transition economies6.  For Russia, Silverman and Yanowitch (1997) concluded that
as of 1994, “women constituted the majority of the working poor and, of course,
represented only a minority of the new rich”. They found that the average female-male
wage ratio was 0.68.  More interestingly, they found a wide variation in the pay gap
depending on which gender dominates a particular occupational category.
Following Juhn et al (1993), Reilly (1999) analysed the gender pay gap in Russia
using 4 rounds of the RLMS data (1992-1996).  He found that the observed monthly
wage gap remained fairly stable (at around 38 percent) throughout. After adjusting for
human capital and other variables, the wage gap increased slightly.  In particular, he
found that women gained in terms of both observed characteristics and prices, and
also in their position in the residual male wage distribution; but these gains were
offset by a dramatic increase in the level of wage dispersion. The findings by Brainerd
                                                
4  For more details, see MacIsaac and Patrinos (1995) and Parternostro and Sahn (2000).
5  See Suen (1997) for more details about decomposition and interpretation of the residual differential.
6(1998) using the VTsIOM  (Russian acronym for All Russian Centres for Public
Opinion Research) monthly cross-section data for 1991, 1993 and 1994 were also
attributed to an increase in wage dispersion7. The female/male wage ratio in the
state/private sector fell quite strikingly from 0.81/0.75 in 1991 to 0.68/0.61 in 1994
but little of this gap could be accounted for by occupational and industry shifts
unfavourable to females.
In line with Reilly (1999) and applying similar methodology, Glinskaya and Mroz
(2000) found little evidence of a significant increase in the level of gender inequality
from 1992 to 1995.   Using the male (female) reward structure as the benchmark, they
found that 97 (74) to 117 (80) percent of the gender gap in wages could be attributed
to differences in rewards or ‘discrimination’. Moreover, they found that the
percentage of gender differences attributed to ‘occupation’ is larger when the female
reward structure is used as a benchmark than when the male reward structure is used,
suggesting larger occupational differences in wages for women than men. In terms of
income distribution, they argued that inequality in male wages increased more than
inequality in female wages and that inequality is a problem in the upper half of the
wage distribution.
In the above studies, the estimated male wage equation is preferred to the female wage
equation on the basis that males are less affected by the underlying discriminatory
process and that the female estimates are more prone to selectivity bias.  Arabsheibani
and Lau (1999) criticise studies that attempt to measure the gender pay gap without
correcting for selectivity bias in the female equation.  They used the 1994 RLMS data
to estimate the female equation incorporating the Heckman (1979) correction for
selectivity bias.  They found that the degree of discrimination was still large (59
percent of the wage differential) but smaller than in studies not correcting for
selectivity bias.
                                                                                                                                           
6 Among others, Paternostro and Sahn (2000) applied the Oaxaca-Ramson framework and analysed the
gender wage gap in Romania while Orazem and Vodopivec (1995, 1998) applied the Juhn et al.
decomposition to Eastern Europe.
7 This study has two drawbacks: i) it is not nationally representative as there is over representation of
highly educated people and ii.) the wages reported are monthly wages unadjusted for hours.
7However, the validity of the Heckman selectivity test depends on the model being
correctly specified.  In addition, note that the measure of “discrimination” relies on the
estimation of the wage equations and on the validity of the OLS assumptions.  That is,
for the decomposition to be valid, the researcher should include all relevant
characteristics in the wage equation and assume that, in the absence of discrimination,
there is no other reason why wages should differ8.
What can we learn from the above studies? Firstly, the measure of ‘discrimination’
depends on the robustness of the estimated wage equation. Therefore, it is important
to address the problems of selectivity bias, potential endogeneity bias and possible
misspecification of the wage equation. Secondly, the analysis of discrimination based
on average wage comparisons is of limited help if the discrimination experienced is
not homogeneous. Therefore, the analysis of earnings discrimination should take into
account the complete distribution of discrimination experienced (Jenkins, 1994).
Thirdly, but no less importantly, there is a need to interpret the empirical results in the
light of the other salient features of the Russian labour market such as delayed wage
payments and payment in kind.
3.  Estimation of the Wage Equation
Our data set comprises rounds 5 (1994), 6 (1995), 7 (1996) and 8 (1998) of the
RLMS. The RLMS is a nationally representative survey of the Russian Federation
providing income, expenditure, demographic, education and labour force information
about households and individuals.
We take different retirement ages into account and restrict our sample to males aged
18 to 60 and females aged 18 to 55. We measure real wages as average real hourly
wages on the main job. The latter is obtained using the Goskomstat regional consumer
price index and the total primary job hours reported for the month prior to the
interview.
8Our data allows us to include demographic variables such as age, proxy educational
attainment, incorporate group occupational categories according to the International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), and control for settlement type and
region.
The underlying specification of our wage equation is similar to that of Reilly (1999)
and Glinskaya and Mroz (2000), but in addition includes a proxy for settlement type
and region.  That is, as explanatory variables we have a set of human capital variables,
augmented with controls for type of settlement and region. The effects of type of
occupation, wage arrears and payments in-kind are picked up from the estimated wage
residuals and taken into consideration when analysing the gender wage gap. This
procedure will enable us to test (and correct when necessary) for sample selection bias
and to examine the extent of omitted variable biases in our estimated wage equation.
We use five education categories9 to signal the level of educational attainment.
Individuals were asked whether or not they completed (i.e. received a diploma)
undergraduate and postgraduate university, technical and medical school, vocational
training  (PTU, FZU, etc.), high school (11 years), or incomplete high school (8
years).  In the absence of information on labour force experience, we include age  (and
age squared) and job tenure.
We classify occupations according to the ISCO one digit classification: legislators,
senior managers and officials; professionals, technicians and associated professionals;
non-manual skilled workers (clerks, service workers and market workers); manual
skilled workers (agriculture and fishery workers, craft and related trades, plant and
machine operators and assemblers); unskilled and armed forces. The different
sampling sites enable us to control for settlement type (urban areas, agricultural
villages and non-agricultural villages) as well as regional characteristics.
                                                                                                                                           
8 We are aware of these caveats when analysing our empirical results. See footnote 14.
9 This was preferred to ‘years of education’ because the effects of education on wages were found to be
non-linear. See Newell and Reilly (1997) for details concerning the advantages of using a set of
educational qualifications in place of years of education in transitional economies.
9The problem of wage arrears and payments in-kind in Russia is particularly acute and
is likely to affect the estimation of the wage equation and the gender pay gap.  Our
dependent variable measures gross real hourly wages on the main job in the last 30
days and not necessarily the contractual real hourly wage.  Given data limitations, and
as suggested by Earle and Sabirianova (1999), we include a qualitative variable which
indicates if the interviewee is experiencing wage arrears in the main job at the time of
the interview.   This is, we know, a crude approximation of wage arrears, though no
more so, given the available data, than attempts at constructing a ‘contractual’ wage10.
Earle and Sabirianova (1999) argue that wage arrears in the labour market have an
independent dynamic from the practice of paying workers in-kind.  Workers signed a
contract to agree payment in-kind (frequently, goods produced by the company) in
exchange for cash.  Given the high cost of finding a new job in Russia, this
‘attachment’ may be used by firms to lower the probability of job mobility. As with
wage arrears, we encounter data problems with payment in-kind and included it as a
qualitative dummy. Table 1 provides a full definition of the variables and summary
statistics.
As for the wage equation, we follow Heckman (1979) and Maddala (1983). The
regression equation is,
1io uββ ++= XW ,  where )σN(0,~u
2
12            (1)
The dependent variable, W, is the market wage and the vector X represents the
exogenous determinants of W. However, W, is only observed for individuals with
positive hours i.e. H > 0.  The shadow-wage equation is thus,
221o uγγγ +++= ZHS , where  )σN(0,~u
2
22 (2)
                                                
10 For example, Glinskaya and Mroz (2000) constructed ‘contractual’ hourly payment using reported
income in kind paid in the last 30 days and the total amount of arrears divided by the number of months
owed.
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Z is the vector of exogenous variables assumed to determine whether W is observed
and it is presupposed that H (hours worked) adjusts such that W=S.  That is
1
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If H>0, the person is in the labour force and we observe W and H and if 0≤H , the
person is not in the labour force.  That is, the selection equation for 0≤H  is
0-uuγγ-ββ 1220io <+−+ ZX (4)
If  221 σ)-u(uvar = , then the probit equation is
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where Φ(.) is the distribution function of the standard normal.  Heckman applies ML
to the following likelihood function
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0H0H
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Note that if the error term from the selection rule and the market wage are correlated,
then standard techniques applied to equation (1) yield biased results.   Also note that
all the variables included in the market wage equation must also be included in the
probit equation since the participation decision (based on the reservation wage)
depends on the mean of the wage offer distribution11.  The Z variables in the selection
equation are required in order to identify the reservation wage function.
                                                
11Arabsheibani and Lau (1999) test for selection bias in the female wage equation and include more
variables in the observed wage equation than in the selection equation. Pailhé (2000) includes
occupational classification and firm ownership in the wage and selection equation.
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We assume that the hourly wage is a function of age, age squared, settlement type,
education, and regional characteristics.  The likelihood of working (i.e. the likelihood
of wages being observed) is assumed to depend additionally on marital status, number
of children less than 17 years old, number of elderly people living at home, and
(implicitly) the hourly wage offer (i.e. our Z variables). Dumwork is the binary
variable that identifies the observations for which wages are observed (or selected).
Given the growing informal sector in Russia, dumwork takes the value of 1 if the
person is working in the formal sector, informal sector or both12.   Here, the implicit
assumption made is that the formal and informal sectors are both affected by the same
reservation wage function. Whilst we recognise that this is far from realistic,
modelling work choice applying conditional probit equations, which is more realistic,
is complex and outside the scope of the present paper.
We do not incorporate job occupation, wages arrears and payment in-kind in the wage
or probit equation, because the questions for these variables were asked only to
individuals who have main jobs. Yet, the effect of these variables will be captured in
the estimated residuals of the wage equation.
Tables 1 to 4 in the appendix present the results of the probit equation and the
Heckman selectivity test.  We found that the female wage equation in round 5 and the
male wage equation for both rounds 6 and 8 exhibited sample selection bias at
conventional five-percent levels. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (λ) is
negative suggesting that participants in the labour force have an advantage over a
person randomly drawn from the population.
Overall, as in Newell and Reilly (1996) and Reilly (1999), the augmented Mincerian
wage equation provides a satisfactory fit to the Russian data, except for females in
round 8.  In terms of the returns to educational qualifications, university education has
a significant effect on both male and female wages in almost all rounds. Postgraduate
education has a statistically positive influence on female wages in all rounds except
                                                
12 We also defined the dummy variable according to a specific number of hours e.g. if in round 5 all
who reported wages worked a minimum of 8 hours, we only assigned 1 to people working in the
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round 7. Technical and medical qualifications have a significant effect only on the
female wage in rounds 6 and 8.  As expected, the female and male earnings pattern
suggests that university graduates are the highest earners followed by technical and
medical graduates, high school leavers and those with vocational training.
Workers living in Central and Central-Black Earth, Volga-Vyatski and Volga-Basin,
and the North Caucasus and, for females, in the Urals fare worse than those living in
other regions.  The magnitude of the female disadvantage is larger than that for males.
Living in Moscow and St Petersburg does not significantly explain the male wage and
has significant negative influence on the female wage in round 5 but a positive
influence in round 8.  Not surprisingly, workers in towns and rural non-agricultural
areas have a significant wage premium over workers living in rural agricultural areas.
One may ask whether possible biases arising from the exclusion of wage arrears or in
kind payment in the wage estimations affect our analysis of their association with the
gender wage gap. In order to check this possibility, we regress residuals from wage
estimations on wage arrears and income in kind controlling for occupation type. We
find that in most cases, there is a significant and negative relationship between the
residuals and wage arrears/payment in kind. This implies that residuals are not white
noise and thus inferences from comparing coefficients in the male equations with
those in the female equations might be biased. However, for most rounds, the sizes of
the coefficient on wage arrears in the male equations are similar to those in the female
equations (see appendix table 5). This is also largely true in the case of payment in
kind. These regression results suggest that the effects of wage arrears and income in
kind on wages are of similar magnitude regardless of gender.  Therefore, the exclusion
of the two variables in wage regressions does not affect the results obtained from
comparing coefficients from the female wage equations with those from the male
wage equations.
4. Measuring the Gender Wage Gap
                                                                                                                                           
informal sector at least 8 hours.   The results do not differ substantially and are not reported.
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According to Oaxaca and Ransom (1989, 1994), the gross wage differential can be
written as:
fBfXmBmXfWmW
ˆˆlnln −=− (8)
and it can de decomposed as
])ˆ()ˆ[()(lnln *** ffmmfmfm XBBXBBBXXWW −+−+−=−
!
(9)
where mWln  and fWln  are the average log wages of male and female, mX  and fX
are the average male and female characteristics or endowments, mBˆ  and fBˆ are the
estimated coefficients of the male and female regression and *B is the estimated
coefficient  of the non-discriminatory wage structure.  We assume that *B is an
estimate of the common wage structure obtained from OLS estimation using a pooled
sample of male and females. That is, the gender wage gap is explained by the
differences in average endowments and by the differences in return to those
endowments.  The first part of the term in [] is interpreted as the ‘male advantage’
(MA) and the second part as the ‘female disadvantage’ (FD).
4.1. The size of the gender wage gap
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the gender wage differential.   According to
the raw wage gap, 96% of the women in the sample of round 5 encounter a
disadvantageous position relative to the non-discriminatory structure. This share
decreased to 88% in round 7 before returning to 96% in round 8.  That is, in all
rounds, the vast majority of women would have been better off if they had received
the non-discriminatory return. The substantial increase in FD in round 8 indicates that
the 1998 financial crisis impinged on women to a greater degree than men. Table 2
also reveals a clear pattern for the substantial MA: the male advantage declined from
94% in round 5 to 88% in round 7 before increasing to 90% in round 8.
The lower half of the table shows the percentage FD and MA relative to the non-
discriminatory situation. The mean of the FD was 5.1% in round 5, decreases to 4.4%
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in round 7 but increases to 6.4% in round 8.  The MA remains between 4.4% and
4.7% until Round 8 when it jumps to 6.3%. However, increases in the standard
deviation of both the FD and MA suggest that the wage distribution among women
has become more uneven over time. In sum, the financial crisis in the second half of
1998 resulted in women suffering from a higher level of wage discrimination than
before the crisis and in addition, the burden of the crisis was shared unequally within
women.13
This latter observation concerning the gender wage gap over time suggests that there
is a close relationship between economic conditions and the gender wage gap. The
Russian economy experienced a rapid stabilisation during 1996. Annual inflation was
reduced from 199.7 % in 1995 to 47.8% in 1996 when round 7 took place. These
relatively favourable economic conditions might have provided a good opportunity for
women to close the gender wage gap. By contrast, the 1998 crisis and ensuing
recession impacted heavily upon the labour market, particularly women and their
wages.  Furthermore, as table 3 shows, men in the middle and upper percentiles of the
wage distribution enjoyed the highest MA. It is also clear that women in the lower
percentiles of the wage distribution experienced the highest FD in rounds 6 and 8 but
it is less clear for rounds 5 and 7 in which the highest FD seems to be affecting the
middle of the wage distribution (table 3).  This indicates that the wages of female
employees towards the lower end of the wage distribution are particularly sensitive to
economic conditions in Russia.
4.2. The composition of the gender wage gap
International comparisons show that the gross log gender wage differential in Russia,
which averaged 0.27 between 1994 and 1998 is higher than that of the UK where it is
approximately 0.20 (Wright and Ermish, 1991).  However, it is largely in line with the
range of the gross wage differential in central and eastern European transition
                                                
13 It is probable that the wage ‘discrimination’ experienced by women is not simply confined to that
explained by human capital variables but also takes the form of occupational or workplace related
discrimination. To the extent that this is true the FD and MA presented in tables 2 and 3 should be
interpreted as the maximum.
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economies. According to Pailhé (2000), the raw wage gap between male and female
employees in 1993 is the lowest in Hungary (0.228) and the highest in Poland (0.298).
However, table 4 shows that, in Russia, the extent of wage discrimination against
women is higher than the gross wage gap, implying that women have a more
favourable endowment than men but actually receive lower wages than men as a result
of wage discrimination14. In contrast, in central and eastern European countries, only
half of the raw wage gap is explained by wage discrimination.
Next, we analyse which sub-groups, in terms of education, age and regions had higher
FD and MA with respect to the non-discriminatory structure. This will help us to
illustrate which sub-groups were worse off in terms of wage discrimination. As table 5
shows, the low education sub-group faces the larger average FD and the lower MA.
The most under-paid women in terms of FD are in the ‘up to high school’ and the
vocational training sub-groups. In terms of FD, women are less under-paid in both the
university/postgraduate education and technical/medical training sub-groups. In
particular, women holding university/postgraduate education tend to have the least
discrimination in both FD and MA in most rounds.
Another interesting question is whether wage discrimination is a cohort-related
problem.  Apart from round 8, wage discrimination after controlling for age is not as
large as found when controlling by education. Differences in wage discrimination
across various cohorts are modest in round 5 and round 7. However, the 18-34 year
old women appear to be most vulnerable to negative economic shocks. Indeed, among
all the age groups, the 18-34 group experienced the largest FD and MA following the
1998 crisis.
The largest variation in the gender wage gap among different subgroups is found
between regions. This confirms a conventional observation that the Russian labour
market is comparatively segregated across regions.  Women in regions such as
                                                
14 One plausible explanation for the closing of the endowment gap is that low qualified women are more
likely to exit the labour market than more qualified women. Note that education explains half of
endowment differences in round 7 and almost everything in the other three rounds.
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Moscow/St. Petersburg (except for round 8), Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin, and the
Urals tend to have the largest FD.  In contrast, women tend to be less underpaid in
North and North-Western and Eastern Siberian and the Far East regions. Note that
during the 1998 crisis, both the FD and MA are lower in Moscow/St. Petersburg than
in any previous years. This reflects the fact that male wages in this region decreased
more substantially than women’s wages did: male wages decreased by 11.6% while
women’s wages declined by 8.3% in 1998.
4.3. The gender wage gap, wage arrears and income in kind
We now turn to an analysis of whether, across gender and income percentiles, there is
a positive or negative correlation between wage discrimination and wage
arrears/wages in kind. A negative association would suggest that wage arrears were
allocated amongst female employees according to the principle of equity, that is, those
with the lowest wages were not also made to suffer by experiencing delays in wage
payment. In contrast, a positive correlation will be found if an employer allocates
wage arrears to women who are less educated or skilled and thus subject to higher
levels of wage discrimination.
Tables 6 and 7 show a very consistent and interesting pattern. Except for the top and
bottom 10% of the female wage earners in 1998, women with wage arrears experience
at most the same FD but usually less than women with no wage arrears.  In a similar
way, apart from round 5, male advantage is lower for male employees who suffer
from wage arrears. These findings suggest that managers were responding more
strongly to equity considerations in their wage allocation decisions among female
employees,15 whereas the MA is much higher for those workers without arrears.
                                                
15 One can argue that women with arrears could have higher wages and thus lower wage discrimination
in the current period if their wage includes an element of repayment from previously experienced
arrears. In other words, some parts of wage arrears were repaid to more women in the current period
and thus women who had wage arrears faced less wage discrimination compared to women who did not
have wage arrears. However, this explanation is difficult to apply to situations where the stock of wage
arrears continued to climb during the period under investigation. Specifically, over 60% of workers
experienced wage arrears in rounds 5 and 6 but this figure grew to more than 70% in rounds 7 and 8.
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The RLMS data reveals that there are more men experiencing wage arrears than
women. For example, 44% of women suffered wage arrears in round 5 compared to
56% of men. The data also suggests that women have been experiencing shorter
periods of arrears than men. In other words, wage arrears were used to bolster
women's position against men who enjoyed wages above their endowment levels. It
would appear that, in Russia, during this period, wage arrears - occurring with greater
propensity and persistence amongst men than women - were a mechanism enabling
women to be compensated for their loss from high wage discrimination. More
precisely, our previous finding implies that, within female employees, wage arrears
were allocated towards women tending to experience less wage discrimination.
Tables 8 and 9 also show that women who received wages in kind have both lower
FD and MA than women who did not receive payment in kind except for sub-groups
of women located towards the lower end of the income distribution. In sum, both
wage arrears and payment in kind decrease both the MA and the FD, and hence
reduce the gender wage gap. That is, wage arrears and payment in kind appear to act
as “compensating” mechanisms offsetting, at least partially, the gender wage
differential. This result is in line with the evidence provided by Earle (1999) who,
among other things, found that the probability of arrears and the magnitude of wage
arrears depend positively on being a male. Furthermore, it does not contradict Friebel
and Guriev's (1999) association of in kind payments with the ‘attachment’ strategies
of firms.
5. Conclusions
In order to analyse gender wage differentials, we first estimated cross section wage
equations using traditional human capital characteristics as regressors and correcting
for selectivity bias where necessary.  Based on these, we uncovered an average gender
wage differential that remained reasonably stable during 1994-1996 before increasing
dramatically following the financial crisis in 1998. In particular, female employees at
the bottom of the wage distribution were hit harder by the financial crisis. The gender
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wage gap is not explained by differences in endowments or characteristics. On the
contrary, Russian women actually benefited from a closure of the gender gap in
observable characteristics. However, we found that this positive effect was more than
offset by the difference in returns to these characteristics.
Additionally we found that workers at lower percentiles of the wage distribution
experienced substantially larger female disadvantage, less male advantage and more
dispersion across years. In contrast, workers at higher percentiles experienced
relatively less female disadvantage and more male advantage. Overall, less educated
women, aged between 18 and 34 were subject to a higher gender pay gap and proved
to be distinctly more vulnerable to negative economic shocks such as the financial
crisis of 1998.
Finally, we found evidence that both wage arrears and payment in kind have helped
limit the gender wage gap, acting as a compensation mechanism for women who
experience a higher differential. Amongst women, wage arrears appear to have been
allocated to those in more favourable labour market situations. This suggests that
managers of Russian enterprises and organisations considered the principle of equity
as one of the more important criteria in allocating wage arrears among female
employees. Even so, women suffering wage arrears in the bottom income decile failed
to enjoy such compensation: clearly, the principle of equity has limits as these were
not treated favourably during the allocation of wage arrears.
The above conclusions must be interpreted with caution because they depend on the
specification of the wage equation. We have not controlled for ‘unobserved’
characteristics such as entrepreneurial responsibilities, attitude towards work, etc.
Another problem that needs to be properly addressed is the decline in formal sector
employment and the increase in informal sector employment. We partially address this
problem when testing for selectivity bias, although a proper account requires the
application of conditional probit equations in either a sequential or a simultaneous
framework. These issues as well as the study of regional wage disparities are
interesting lines for further research.
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Table 1
Definition of Variables
Variable Mean (Rounds 5 to 8) Definition
Male Female
Demographic Characteristics
Age 38.52 (10) 38.17 (8.7) Males: 18-59; Females: 18-54
Primary Employment
Lnrwrlm 2.80 (1.03) 2.54 (0.97) Gross average real hourly wages in primary job
job tenure 6.86 (8.32) 7.57 (7.84) Job tenure in current primary job
Human Capital Controls
Postgraduate 0.01 (0.12) 0.009 (0.1) Postgraduate university education
Undergraduate 0.20 (0.40) 0.24 (0.43) Undergraduate university education
Technical & medical 0.16 (0.37) 0.34 (0.47) Technical and Medical School
Vocational training 0.27 (0.45) 0.16 (0.37) Vocational Training (PTU, FZU, FZO)
High school 0.26 (0.44) 0.19 (0.40) Complete high School education (11 years)
Incomplete high school 0.08 (0.28) 0.05 (0.21) Incomplete high school education (8 years)
Occupation  Type
Managers & officials 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.13) Legislators, senior managers & officials
Profession & technicians 0.21 (0.41) 0.50 (0.50) Professionals, technicians & associated professionals
Non-manual 0.07 (0.26) 0.23 (0.42) Clerks, service workers & market workers
Manual 0.58 (0.49) 0.13 (0.34) Agriculture, fisheries, plant & machine operators,
crafts & related trades
Unskilled 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.32) Unskilled occupations
Region and Settlement Type
Town 0.78 (0.42) 0.77 (0.42) Urban areas
Rural non agriculture 0.05 (0.22) 0.66 (0.24) Villages where the majority of people are not
engaged in agriculture
Rural agriculture 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) Villages where the majority of people are engaged in
agriculture
Moscow, St. Petersburg 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) Moscow, St. Petersburg
Northern&NorthWestern 0.08 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27) Northern and North Western
Central&Central Black-
Earth
0.19 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) Central and Central Black-Earth
Volga-Vaytski&Volga
Basin
0.16 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38) Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin
North Caucasian 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29) North Caucasian
Ural 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38) Ural
Western Siberian 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.28) Western Siberian
EasternSiberian&Far-
Eastern
0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.28) Eastern Siberian and Far-Eastern
Other Variables
Payment in kind 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) Received goods in lieu of payment in last 30 days
Wage arrears 0.40 (.49) 0.38 (0.49) Owed money by enterprise at time of interview
Sample Size
4,361 4,608
Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.
Source: RLMS Rounds 5-8.
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Table 2
Summary statistics of the female disadvantage (FD) and male advantage (MA)
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
FD MA FD MA FD MA FD MA
Difference in
Returns
Mean 0.147 0.143 0.134 0.133 0.125 0.136 0.142 0.156
Median 0.147 0.152 0.126 0.145 0.123 0.142 0.126 15.7
Maximum 0.359 0.377 0.462 0.341 0.338 0.365 0.637 58.0
Minimum -0.106 -0.138 -0.032 -0.207 -0.203 -0.228 -0.078 -0.281
Std dev 0.073 0.086 0.025 0.089 0.099 0.142 0.098 0.128
% positive 96.5 93.6 90.6 90.9 88.2 88.1 96.3 90.1
Differentials
(%)
Mean 5.1 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.4 6.4 6.3
Median 5.0 5.0 4.6 5.0 4.5 4.9 5.8 6.6
Maximum 12.1 12.4 19.4 13.0 12.1 12.1 37.8 29.1
Minimum -3.2 -5.7 -6.4 -10.0 -8.9 -8.9 -4.1 -18.0
Std dev 2.5 2.8 4.2 3.3 3.7 3.7 5.0 6.6
Table 3
Female disadvantage (FD) and male advantage (MA) according to income percentiles
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Cum. sample
share (%)
FD MA FD MA FD MA FD MA
10 4.3 3.4 8.0 5.0 2.2 -1.2 10.6 6.0
20 6.3 4.2 7.4 4.3 3.2 1.1 8.4 6.1
30 5.8 4.4 6.7 4.9 3.4 2.7 7.7 6.2
40 5.6 4.4 6.8 4.8 4.1 3.3 7.9 6.2
50 5.5 4.6 7.0 5.0 4.7 3.7 7.8 6.6
60 6.8 4.8 6.1 5.4 5.0 4.2 7.4 6.8
70 5.5 4.8 5.9 5.1 4.8 4.6 7.2 6.9
80 5.4 4.6 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.6 7.0 6.8
90 5.2 4.7 5.3 4.9 4.6 4.6 6.7 6.8
100 5.0 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.7 6.2 6.4
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Table 4
Average decomposition of difference in ln hourly wages
RLMS 5 RLMS 6 RLMS 7 RLMS 8
Total difference in log
earnings
0.279 0.261 0.246 0.280
Endowment differences -0.011 -0.006 -0.015 -0.018
Regions -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.002
Age -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
Education -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 -0.017
Difference in returns 0.290 0.267 0.261 0.298
Female disadvantage 0.147 0.134 0.125 0.142
Male advantage 0.143 0.133 0.136 0.156
Table 5
 Decomposition of female disadvantage (FD) and male advantage (MA) by
endowment
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
FD MA FD MA FD MA FD MA
All 5.1 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.4 6.4 6.3
Education
High school 6.2 4.5 7.0 3.9 6.0 3.8 9.3 6.2
Vocational training 8.5 4.3 10.7 5.7 4.6 2.6 7.4 4.6
Technical-medical 3.7 7.4 2.9 5.5 3.6 6.7 5.1 8.9
University/Postgrad 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.5 5.2 4.6 5.7
Age
Age between 18 and 34 6.6 4.3 7.6 6.0 5.0 3.8 10.4 9.3
Age between 35 and 44 5.8 6.5 4.8 5.2 3.8 4.7 5.4 5.3
Age between 45 and 55 5.1 4.6 5.1 4.0 4.8 4.3 5.6 4.6
Region
Moscow, St. Petersburg 6.7 5.0 6.5 5.2 4.1 3.5 4.1 2.0
Northern and North
Western
1.4 0.3 3.8 2.7 0.7 0.4 6.3 7.3
Central and Central Black-
Earth
5.8 4.2 4.3 3.1 2.8 2.9 6.7 5.7
Volga-Vyatski and Volga
Basin
7.0 6.1 7.4 6.7 5.8 5.2 6.9 5.4
North Caucasian 5.1 2.0 11.6 7.5 2.5 1.7 11.1 10.3
Ural 5.9 4.8 7.4 6.8 9.3 8.2 10.8 8.1
Western Siberian 5.6 4.2 4.2 3.2 5.1 5.4 3.8 1.9
Eastern Siberian and Far-
Eastern
6.0 6.2 -0.4 -1.8 -2.7 -3.7 5.6 5.9
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Table 6
Female disadvantage according to wage arrears (%)
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Cum. Sample
share (%)
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
10 5.5 5.3 8.8 8.3 3.1 1.6 9.9 11.0
20 6.2 5.0 7.9 6.5 3.8 2.3 8.5 8.1
30 6.2 5.1 7.4 6.0 4.3 2.5 8.5 7.1
40 5.9 5.1 7.3 5.4 4.9 2.9 8.4 6.8
50 5.7 5.1 6.7 5.7 5.3 3.7 7.8 7.1
60 5.7 5.2 6.2 5.5 5.2 4.3 7.5 6.9
70 5.5 5.2 6.1 5.2 5.0 4.3 7.0 6.8
80 5.5 5.2 5.8 5.1 4.9 4.2 6.8 6.8
90 5.3 5.1 5.5 4.7 4.9 4.2 6.4 6.5
100 5.1 4.9 5.2 4.4 4.7 4.1 5.9 6.1
Table 7
Male advantage according to wage arrears (%)
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Cum. sample
share (%)
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
No wage
arrears
Wage
arrears
10 3.1 3.2 4.9 3.9 -1.1 -1.1 7.2 5.3
20 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.2 2.0 0.3 6.4 5.9
30 4.1 4.8 4.9 4.2 3.3 2.0 6.2 6.1
40 4.2 4.8 4.9 4.7 3.7 2.7 6.5 6.2
50 4.5 4.8 5.2 4.7 4.1 3.3 6.7 6.3
60 4.5 5.2 5.6 4.9 4.5 3.9 7.1 6.5
70 4.5 5.2 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.3 7.0 6.7
80 4.4 5.0 5.1 4.7 4.6 4.6 6.8 6.8
90 4.6 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.6 6.5 6.8
100 4.6 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.7 6.1 6.6
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Table 8
Female disadvantage according to wages in kind (%)
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Cum. sample
share (%)
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
10 4.6 6.5 7.8 11.1 2.3 1.3 10.1 12.9
20 6.0 5.5 7.3 9.4 3.2 2.8 8.1 8.7
30 5.9 5.4 6.8 7.7 3.4 2.6 7.6 6.4
40 5.7 5.3 6.9 6.6 4.1 3.4 7.8 5.9
50 5.6 5.2 6.5 5.5 4.6 4.2 7.6 6.6
60 5.6 5.0 6.0 5.1 4.9 4.2 7.2 6.7
70 5.5 5.0 5.9 5.1 4.9 4.0 7.1 6.6
80 5.5 5.0 5.6 5.1 4.7 3.5 6.8 6.5
90 5.2 5.0 5.3 4.9 4.6 3.6 6.6 6.0
100 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.6 3.7 6.1 5.6
Table 9
Male advantage according to wage in kind (%)
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Cum.  sample
share (%)
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
No wage
in kind
Wage in
kind
10 3.7 2.9 5.4 3.0 -1.3 -0.7 6.0 6.2
20 4.5 2.3 4.6 2.9 1.3 -0.4 6.4 7.2
30 4.6 2.6 5.1 2.3 2.9 0.2 6.4 5.7
40 4.5 3.0 5.0 2.3 3.4 1.7 6.4 5.8
50 4.8 3.3 5.1 2.8 4.0 1.9 6.7 5.5
60 4.9 3.6 5.6 3.3 4.3 2.7 7.0 5.5
70 4.8 3.9 5.2 3.8 4.6 3.1 7.0 5.8
80 4.7 4.1 5.1 3.6 4.6 3.5 7.0 5.8
90 4.7 4.3 5.0 3.6 4.7 3.7 6.8 5.9
100 4.7 4.6 4.8 3.6 4.8 3.8 6.5 5.9
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Appendix
Table 1
Probit equation estimation results for the male sample
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Coefficient t- value coefficient t- value Coefficient t- value coefficient t- value
Constant -2.300 -7.505 -2.253 -7.072 -2.000 -5.823 -2.656 -8.300
Age 0.100 5.986 0.100 5.634 0.076 3.996 0.114 6.380
age-squared -0.001 -5.787 -0.001 -5.845 -0.001 -4.253 -0.002 -6.619
Town 0.344 4.944 0.372 5.344 0.406 5.459 0.343 4.809
Rural non agriculture 0.220 1.835 0.186 1.456 -0.089 -0.701 -0.131 -1.068
Rural agriculture Omitted
Postgrad 0.542 2.027 9.015 20.973 0.354 1.035 0.841 2.125
University 0.400 4.148 0.434 3.974 0.441 3.689 0.446 3.591
Technical & medical 0.337 3.405 0.239 2.180 0.473 3.888 0.405 3.347
Vocational training 0.282 3.222 0.212 2.182 0.189 1.708 0.336 2.997
high school 0.086 1.052 0.108 1.174 0.149 1.407 0.077 0.708
up to elementary school Omitted
Moscow, St  Petesburg 0.385 3.035 0.331 2.343 0.503 3.266 0.129 0.813
Northern&North Western Omitted
Central&CentralBlack-
Earth
0.167 1.489 --0.087 -0.732 -0.202 -1.624 0.068 0.545
Volga-Vyatski&Volga-
Basin
0.053 0.472 -0.242 -2.062 -0.242 -1.931 -0.192 -1.538
North Caucasian 0.042 0.357 -0.140 -1.135 -0.254 -1.913 -0.329 -2.464
Ural 0.210 1.803 -0.117 -0.974 -0.024 -0.187 0.100 0.766
Western Siberia -0.031 -0.250 -0.246 -1.880 -0.273 -2.012 -0.289 -2.114
EasternSiberia&Far Eastern -0.089 -0.630 -0.325 -2.469 -0.583 -4.162 -0.015 -0.105
Married 0.201 3.146 0.455 6.254 0.320 4.079 0.413 4.184
Children -0.026 -0.925 -0.075 -2.552 -0.027 -0.903 -0.073 -2.066
Elderly -0.137 -2.869 --0.096 -2.079 -0.173 -3.382 -0.160 -3.302
Lambda -0.521 -1.197 -0.355 -2.724 -0.308 -0.691 -0.764 -2.831
N censored 1126 1176 1355 1319
N uncensored 1426 1214 964 1040
t-values obtained from Huber/White/sandwich variance estimates
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Table 2
Wage equation estimation results for the male sample
Dependent variable:  ln hourly (gross) wage from main job
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Coefficient t- value coefficient t- value coefficient t- value coefficient t- value
Constant 1.946 5.848 2.594 5.768 1.719 4.066 3.690 3.977
Age 0.037 2.165 0.002 0.108 0.026 1.240 -0.041 -1.184
age-squared -0.001 -2.380 -0.000 -0.228 -0.000 -1.436 0.000 0.971
Town 0.700 9.102 0.640 7.200 0.789 7.406 0.609 4.671
rural non agriculture 0.629 4.794 0.421 2.673 0.645 3.608 0.854 4.482
rural agriculture Omitted
Postgrad 0.589 3.074 0.112 0.534 0.192 0.755 0.104 0.211
University 0.412 4.706 0.266 2.233 0.434 3.183 0.180 0.995
technical & medical 0.194 2.014 0.074 0.633 0.257 1.769 -0.043 -0.239
Vocational training 0.043 0.469 0.052 0.470 0.070 0.512 -0.210 -1.308
high school 0.097 1.117 0.102 0.697 0.226 1.727 -0.068 -0.463
up to elementary school Omitted
Moscow, St  Petesburg 0.016 0.147 0.157 1.203 0.212 1.378 0.062 0.371
Northern&North Western Omitted
Central&CentralBlack-
Earth
-0.413 -4.153 -0.327 -2.875 -0.300 -1.979 -0.413 -2.601
Volga-Vyatski&Volga-
Basin
-0.641 -6.311 -0.443 -3.864 -0.553 -3.666 -0.576 -3.578
North Caucasian -0.448 -3.901 -0.157 -1.201 -0.230 -1.414 -0.094 -0.514
Ural -0.209 -2.108 -0.149 -1.324 -0.024 -0.158 -0.266 -1.656
Western Siberia 0.095 0.809 0.190 1.382 0.274 1.538 0.050 0.257
EasternSiberia&Far-Eastern 0.306 2.048 -0.030 -0.213 -0.210 -1.141 -0.104 -0.561
F 21.73 14.24
R-squared 0.196 0.201
N 1427 1214 965 1040
t-values obtained from Huber/White/sandwich variance estimates
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Table 3
Probit equation estimation results for the female sample
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Coefficient t- value coefficient t- value coefficient t- value coefficient t- value
Constant -5.068 -13.10 -4.678 -11.601 -4.686 -11.466 -3.953 -10.204
Age 0.254 11.333 0.233 9.967 0.223 9.209 0.196 8.582
age-squared -0.003 -9.918 -0.003 -8.769 -0.003 -8.059 -0.002 -7.790
Town 0.156 2.231 0.239 3.383 0.368 5.122 0.236 3.464
rural non agriculture 0.072 0.596 0.266 2.196 0.250 2.093 0.023 0.205
rural agriculture Omitted
Postgrad 0.824 2.379 0.827 2.022 0.863 2.078 0.479 1.371
University 0.535 5.054 0.447 3.732 0.509 3.937 0.479 3.478
technical & medical 0.471 4.763 0.470 4.157 0.437 3.521 0.380 2.897
Vocational training 0.232 2.149 0.275 2.290 0.284 2.181 0.222 1.643
high school 0.249 2.501 0.096 0.850 0.143 1.156 0.020 0.150
up to elementary school Omitted
Moscow, St  Petesburg 0.051 0.406 0.210 1.597 0.355 2.569 0.189 1.349
Northern&North Western Omitted
Central&CentralBlack-
Earth
0.055 0.480 0.068 0.591 0.035 0.297 0.126 1.118
Volga-Vyatski&Volga-
Basin
0.170 1.488 -0.061 -0.533 -0.219 -1.868 -0.154 -1.364
North Caucasian -0.110 -0.905 -0.197 -1.589 -0.260 -2.032 -0.255 -2.056
Ural 0.176 1.512 0.164 1.407 -0.055 -0.460 -0.003 -0.022
Western Siberia -0.157 -1.245 -0.181 -1.417 -.-0.111 -0.861 -0.279 -2.192
EasternSiberia&Far Eastern 0.091 0.724 0.016 0.123 -0.410 -3.087 -0.044 -0.340
Married -0.068 -1.237 -0.151 -2.457 -0.207 -3.373 -0.100 -1.764
Children -0.119 -4.005 -0.141 -4.666 -0.142 -4.508 -0.137 -4.251
Elderly -0.129 -2.550 0.008 0.158 -0.045 -0.868 -0.095 -1.846
Lambda -0.214 -2.241 -0.022 0.163 -0.062 0.224 0.043 0.268
N censored 1247 1281 1489 1507
N uncensored 1392 1231 1040 1133
t-values obtained from Huber/White/sandwich variance estimates
30
Table 4
Wage equation estimation results for the female sample
Dependent variable:  log of hourly (gross) wage from main job
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
Coefficient t- value coefficient t- value coefficient t- value coefficient t- value
Constant 3.693 6.795 1.387 3.359 1.889 3.913 0.247 0.531
Age -0.044 -1.716 0.032 1.423 0.235 0.921 0.053 2.248
age-squared 0.001 1.519 -0.000 -1.227 -0.000 -1.006 -0.001 -2.075
Town 0.545 7.837 0.569 7.478 0.495 5.468 0.636 7.452
rural non agriculture 0.613 5.130 0.448 3.510 0.350 2.519 0.635 4.646
rural agriculture Omitted
Postgrad 0.560 2.604 0.689 3.160 0.259 1.059 0.892 2.933
University 0.415 4.293 0.548 4.508 0.401 2.833 0.872 5.350
technical & medical 0.106 1.143 0.319 2.724 0.215 1.566 0.597 3.731
Vocational training -0.042 -0.425 0.118 0.952 0.098 0.680 0.453 2.714
high school 0.062 0.651 0.249 2.049 0.184 1.273 0.384 2.288
up to elementary school Omitted
Moscow, St  Petesburg -0.295 -2.812 0.082 0.711 0.115 0.902 0.297 2.000
Northern&North Western Omitted
Central&CentralBlack-
Earth
-0.638 -6.592 -0.346 -3.182 -0.362 -3.030 -0.302 -2.236
Volga-Vyatski&Volga-
Basin
-0.937 -10.137 -0.633 -5.824 -0.702 -5.979 -0.533 -3.987
North Caucasian -0.570 -5.213 -0.496 -4.125 -0.341 -2.691 -0.357 -2.404
Ural -0.468 -4.716 -0.322 -2.989 -0.424 -3.577 -0.290 -2.127
Western Siberia -0.118 -0.998 0.131 0.994 0.042 0.291 0.082 0.495
EasternSiberia&Far-Eastern -0.074 -0.682 0.095 0.768 -0.019 -0.130 0.015 0.090
F 17.71 11.47 15.43
R-squared 0.193 0.144 0.184
N 1392 1232 1043 1136
t-values obtained from Huber/White/sandwich variance estimates
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Table 5
OLS regressions on the estimated residuals from the female and male wage equation
Females Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Manager 0.236 0.789 0.331 2.224 0.561 3.045 0.050 0.198
Professional 0.116 2.075 0.141 2.542 0.114 1.947 0.056 0.843
Manual 0.205 2.629 0.302 3.962 0.313 3.732 0.263 2.938
Unskill -0.147 -1.811 -0.028 -0.308 0.012 0.121 0.019 0.196
Wage arrears -0.225 -4.029 -0.341 -6.252 -0.491 -8.888 -0.320 -5.773
Payment in kind -0.117 -1.329 -0.140 -1.344 -0.092 -0.845 -0.321 -3.558
Constant -0.013 -0.285 -0.016 -0.351 0.115 2.522 0.136 2.464
R-squared 0.034 0.056 0.091 0.059
N 1354 1196 996 1062
t-values obtained from Huber/White/sandwich variance estimates
Males Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Manager 0.156 1.014 0.385 2.910 0.618 2.661 0.250 1.241
Professional -0.027 -0.290 0.071 0.726 0.230 2.256 0.224 2.098
Manual 0.007 0.077 0.150 1.911 0.246 2.767 0.201 2.138
Unskill -0.240 -1.947 -0.224 -2.007 -0.060 -0.482 -0.096 -0.787
Wage arrears -0.242 -4.396 -0.352 -5.983 -0.403 -6.775 -0.391 -6.862
Payment in kind -0.323 -2.905 -0.180 -1.622 -0.542 -4.969 -0.339 -3.874
Constant 0.108 1.329 0.024 0.329 0.043 0.505 0.091 1.021
R-squared 0.034 0.056 0.115 0.086
N 1370 1150 893 948
t-values obtained from Huber/White/sandwich variance estimates
